We present a geometric model of social choice when the latter takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of constituent elements an authority enjoys a vast power of determining the social outcome. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which a social outcome may be a local or global optimum for a set of objects, and we show that, by appropriately redefining the set of objects, intransitive cycles may be broken and the median voter may be turned into a loser.

Social Choice among Complex Objects

SETTEPANELLA S
2014-01-01

Abstract

We present a geometric model of social choice when the latter takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of constituent elements an authority enjoys a vast power of determining the social outcome. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which a social outcome may be a local or global optimum for a set of objects, and we show that, by appropriately redefining the set of objects, intransitive cycles may be broken and the median voter may be turned into a loser.
13
5
1
26
http://annaliscienze.sns.it/index.php?page=ForthcomingArticles
hyperplane arrangements; graphs; social choice; object construction power; agenda power; intransitive cycles; median voter
MARENGO L; SETTEPANELLA S
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Mare_Sette_Annali.pdf

Accesso aperto

Tipo di file: PDF EDITORIALE
Dimensione 768.79 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
768.79 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/1843783
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 2
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact