This article addresses the controversy concerning amnesty in international law. Traditionally, amnesty was seen as the substance of peace and there was a presumption of the legitimacy of amnesty under international law. During the past two decades, some scholars and regional human rights courts have reached the opposite conclusion, claiming the existence of a prohibition against amnesty for gross human rights violations. In this view, amnesty would not be a legitimate option in order to allow a pacific post-war or post-dictatorship transition to democracy. The article describes such an evolution and analyses both the motivations of those who support such a prohibition and the consequences on the concept of punitive power, the relationships between individual rights and law in general, and criminal law and democracy.
Transitional Amnesties: Can they be prohibited?
Paolo Caroli
2018-01-01
Abstract
This article addresses the controversy concerning amnesty in international law. Traditionally, amnesty was seen as the substance of peace and there was a presumption of the legitimacy of amnesty under international law. During the past two decades, some scholars and regional human rights courts have reached the opposite conclusion, claiming the existence of a prohibition against amnesty for gross human rights violations. In this view, amnesty would not be a legitimate option in order to allow a pacific post-war or post-dictatorship transition to democracy. The article describes such an evolution and analyses both the motivations of those who support such a prohibition and the consequences on the concept of punitive power, the relationships between individual rights and law in general, and criminal law and democracy.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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