La tesi di Brentano e le sue influenze nel pensiero analitico

The aim of this paper is to show the historical influence exercised by the so-called Brentano’s thesis. According to Brentano intentionality, i.e. the property of being about something or having content, is both necessary and sufficient condition of the mental: all and only mental phenomena exhibit intentionality. From this point of view, Brentano’s thesis responds to a cartesian, dualistic need, insofar as it tries to distinguish the mental from the physical. This idea, deepened by Husserl, is taken up by early analytic philosophy and becomes the ground of the intentionalist program, according to which the qualitative aspects of the mental have to be brought back to its intentional features. The review ends with some notes on Sellarsian adverbialism, pointing the way for future theoretical investigations on the role that this position has in contemporary reflection.