The diffusion of independent anticorruption authorities (ACAs) has been an important global trend over the past few decades. Yet, little comparative work has been done to explain variations in formal and de facto independence of ACAs across political systems and governance contexts. This chapter contributes an analytical bridge between regulatory theory and anticorruption literature, which have practically ignored each other so far. It reviews the emerging literature that aims to explain the diversity of the organizational forms taken by the anticorruption drive in different contexts. This strand of research has shed light on the structure of incentives behind anticorruption reform: as the ideal of anticorruption makes political principals a potential target for sanctions, the independence of ACAs becomes appealing to leaders only to the extent that it generates electoral support, and otherwise dangerous whenever investigations hit close to home. Diachronic examination of variations in the independence of ACAs has highlighted that their development trajectories is shaped by the interplay between the degree of political support from changing governments and agency activism. The latter factor has been taken into account by recent studies, which argue that the de facto autonomy of ACAs is not only a product of their legislative frameworks, but equally emanates from their leaders' ability to construct their organisational legitimacy, identity and reputation in the eyes of multiple audiences. Against this background, the conclusive section sketches an agenda for further research around the following points: the relevance of quantitative and mixed-method studies on cross-national variations in ACAs' independence; the need to fill the gap of studies comparing performance metrics across ACAs; the importance of an inquiry into the relational nature of ACAs' independence in a multi-level and multi-actor context; the significance of greater insight about the effects of repetitive reform, which is crucial for ACAs to remain adaptable to a turbulent environment.

Anticorruption authorities

Di Mascio, Fabrizio;
2022-01-01

Abstract

The diffusion of independent anticorruption authorities (ACAs) has been an important global trend over the past few decades. Yet, little comparative work has been done to explain variations in formal and de facto independence of ACAs across political systems and governance contexts. This chapter contributes an analytical bridge between regulatory theory and anticorruption literature, which have practically ignored each other so far. It reviews the emerging literature that aims to explain the diversity of the organizational forms taken by the anticorruption drive in different contexts. This strand of research has shed light on the structure of incentives behind anticorruption reform: as the ideal of anticorruption makes political principals a potential target for sanctions, the independence of ACAs becomes appealing to leaders only to the extent that it generates electoral support, and otherwise dangerous whenever investigations hit close to home. Diachronic examination of variations in the independence of ACAs has highlighted that their development trajectories is shaped by the interplay between the degree of political support from changing governments and agency activism. The latter factor has been taken into account by recent studies, which argue that the de facto autonomy of ACAs is not only a product of their legislative frameworks, but equally emanates from their leaders' ability to construct their organisational legitimacy, identity and reputation in the eyes of multiple audiences. Against this background, the conclusive section sketches an agenda for further research around the following points: the relevance of quantitative and mixed-method studies on cross-national variations in ACAs' independence; the need to fill the gap of studies comparing performance metrics across ACAs; the importance of an inquiry into the relational nature of ACAs' independence in a multi-level and multi-actor context; the significance of greater insight about the effects of repetitive reform, which is crucial for ACAs to remain adaptable to a turbulent environment.
2022
Handbook of Regulatory Authorities
Edward Elgar
177
191
9781839108983
9781839108990
https://www.elgaronline.com/view/book/9781839108990/book-part-9781839108990-21.xml
open government; corruption
Di Mascio, Fabrizio; Maggetti, Martino; Natalini, Alessandro
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/1874000
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