Con-fusione dei poteri. L’Unione europea. Stati, infra-Stati e sovra-Stato: anarchia di sovranismi?

The essay deals with the theme of the con-fusion of powers caused by the undermining of State sovereignty both upwards and downwards: through the action of both the European Union (and, increasingly, the international order) and the regional autonomy (special, ordinary and, in perspective, differentiated). In an attempt to illustrate very complex phenomena, the discussion is structured in two distinct sections. The first one is focused on the connection between the State order and the European Union order (with some hints to the international order, in particular with regard to the hypothesis that the EU adheres to the European Convention on Human Rights). It analyses the contrast between the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Constitutional Court on the primacy of European law, as well as the position of the judges in the dialogue with both Courts, also in the light of the sentence of the Constitutional Court n. 269/2017, that re-opened problems apparently outdated. The second one is about the relation between the State order and the regional order. It examines the «regionalist» constitutional reforms of 1999 and 2001, the difficulties of their implementation, the risks involved in the differentiated regionalism promoted by Veneto, Lombardy and Emilia Romagna, and lastly the regional involvement in the production and enforcement of European law. Lastly, these two sections are briefly combined in a unitary perspective. It allows understanding, at least partially, the potential con-fusions resulting from the overall interweaving of European, national and regional dynamics. It emerges that both the relations between the European Union and the State, and the relations between the State and the regions (and, for those aspects in which they overlap, the relations between the European Union, the State and the regions) are only to some extent regulated by legal norms written in the European Treaties and in the Constitution. The remaining —very significant— part is the result of the jurisdictional interpretation of the Court of Justice of the European Union, of the Constitutional Court and of the judges (in connection with one or the other). The outcome is the increasingly marginalization of democratically elected legislators in favour of the judicial powers operating in the different legal systems, sometimes in opposition to each other, but more often in mutual dialogue.