The topic of this paper is the relationship between phenomenology and ontology in the last period of Michel Henry’s philosophical production, and above all in his book Incarnation (2000). The core of Hen-ry’s understanding of this relationship is a double reversal: there is a reversal of the relationship between appearing and being, or between phenomenology and ontology, but there is also a reversal in phenomenol-ogy itself, so that the phenomenology of being is replaced by the phenomenology of life. In the conclusion of the paper, I try to show the relevance of the topic of the relationship between being and life for Henry’s refusal of reductionism. Henry’s opposition to Heidegger’s understanding of the relationship between be-ing and life shows that scientistic reductionism is not the only reductionism.
Fenomenologia e ontologia in Incarnation di Michel Henry. Un doppio rovesciamento
Ezio Gamba
In corso di stampa
Abstract
The topic of this paper is the relationship between phenomenology and ontology in the last period of Michel Henry’s philosophical production, and above all in his book Incarnation (2000). The core of Hen-ry’s understanding of this relationship is a double reversal: there is a reversal of the relationship between appearing and being, or between phenomenology and ontology, but there is also a reversal in phenomenol-ogy itself, so that the phenomenology of being is replaced by the phenomenology of life. In the conclusion of the paper, I try to show the relevance of the topic of the relationship between being and life for Henry’s refusal of reductionism. Henry’s opposition to Heidegger’s understanding of the relationship between be-ing and life shows that scientistic reductionism is not the only reductionism.
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