From one-sect one-vote to one-man one-vote? Demands for reforming the electoral system in Lebanon

Between the end of 2019 and the beginning of 2020, Lebanon was hit by an unprecedented series of crises since the end of the civil war. Although Lebanon respects a series of formal requirements, such as free and fair elections, the presence of recognised institutions, the existence of many political parties and an active civil society, from a substantive point of view, especially after the signature of the Taif Agreement in 1989, the Lebanese consocia- tional system has become increasingly rigid and devoted almost exclusively to keep itself alive in what has been labelled ‘neoliberal sectarianism’. Since the end of the civil conflict, the country has seen the emergence of the contradictions of a consociational system, whose legitimacy has gradually been eroded by internal and external factors. A less superficial look reveals how, for example, elections – recognised as crucial indicators of levels of democ- racy – are anything but free and regular. On the contrary, they are the outcome of sectar- ian compromises and hostage to more or less secret negotiations. This chapter argues that the Lebanese electoral system is a crucial factor in the strengthening of this degenerating consociational system. Clientelism is the main trait of Lebanese elections, which, instead of contributing to a genuine democratisation process, are part of power-sharing dynamics that ‘imprison’ actors and prevent change. They represent a strong source of legitimacy for the sectarian leaders who, through patronage and the allocation of benefits, accumulate politi- cal capital to keep the consociational system alive, exploit it, and boost their privileges at various levels.