The theory of mental models distinguishes between the meanings of causes and enabling conditions—a distinction not yet made in English and Continental law. The legal “but for” test (or sine qua non) for factual causes errs in both omission and commission. The theory of mental models therefore replaces it with more precise tests for “causes” and “enables”. These and the rejection of “proximate” causes (also known as “legal” causes) would bring jurisprudence closer to the everyday concept of causation.
Causation, the Law, and Mental Models.
Monica Bucciarelli
2023-01-01
Abstract
The theory of mental models distinguishes between the meanings of causes and enabling conditions—a distinction not yet made in English and Continental law. The legal “but for” test (or sine qua non) for factual causes errs in both omission and commission. The theory of mental models therefore replaces it with more precise tests for “causes” and “enables”. These and the rejection of “proximate” causes (also known as “legal” causes) would bring jurisprudence closer to the everyday concept of causation.
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