THE PERFORMATIVE SENSE OF AGENCY: AN IMPROVISATIONAL ACCOUNT OF ACTION

The most widespread approach of current action theories to the relationship between intention and action performance is causalism. The intention to perform an action is conceived of an action plan prior to, and decoupled from, the specific action situation, while «sense of agency» is explained as a post-hoc phenomenon; that is, as the perception of oneself as an agent. Consequently, the intention is severed from the action as its preceding cause or as a post-hoc awareness, thereby leaving its real-world efficacy unexplained. This paper aims to get out of the impasse of the causal paradigm by offering a different explanation of intentional agency, that is, of organized, orientated, and purposeful behavior. Our proposal is focused on the idea that action is improvisation. Improvisation allows for shaping an action according to a specific situation so that intentional performance and behavioral spontaneity are understood as intertwined and both necessary for explaining human action. The improvisational model of action we propose endorses both a «Arendtian» and «Anscombian» view of action as well as neo-phenomenological accounts of action. As such, our proposal has several advantages over alternative models. In particular, it avoids shortcomings of the causal model of action by recognizing the constitutive roles of the specific action performance situation, habits of behavior, and performative consciousness for shaping the intentionality of action.