Bayesians too should follow Wason: A comprehensive accuracy-based analysis of the selection task

Wason’s selection task is a paramount experimental problem in the study of human reasoning, often connected with the celebrated ravens paradox in the philosophical literature. Various normative accounts of the selection task rely on a Bayesian approach. Some claim vindication of participants’ rationality. Others don’t, thus following Wason’s original intuition that observed responses are mistaken. In this paper we argue that, despite claims to the contrary, all these accounts actually speak to the same effect: Wason was right. First, we provide a new accuracy-based analysis of the selection task, that includes the existing proposals as special cases. We then show on this basis that none can actually vindicate participants’ rationality. We conclude that all normative renditions considered eventually concur: all in all, Bayesians should follow Wason in the selection task.