Se il necessariamente esistente sia Dio. Pareyson tra Schelling, Kant e Spinoza

The aim of this paper is to emphasise the presence of an inescapable Spinozian moment in the speculative proposal of Schelling and Pareyson. In the Pareysonian school, Spinoza's philosophy is, as is well known, the object of widespread disapproval, since, by denying evil and freedom, it is allegedly incompatible with both the ontology of evil and the ontology of freedom. Such an evaluation enters into cognitive dissonance with the very central – and largely positive – role that Spinoza's philosophy plays in Lecture VIII of Schelling's Philosophy of Revelation and, consequently, in the theoretical structure of Pareyson's essay on the astonishment/awe/stupor of reason, which nevertheless mentions Spinoza only en passant, downplaying his contribution. Disapproval and dissonance combine to fail to recognise that astonished reason is a Spinozian reason, albeit a modified one. Hence the opportuneness of that emphasis, whose “heretical” character I am well aware of and which would probably not have been welcomed by Pareyson, constituting rather a ground for embarrassment.