This paper develops the idea that valid arguments are equivalent to true conditionals by combining Kripke’s theory of truth with the evidential account of conditionals offered by Crupi and Iacona. As will be shown, in a first-order language that contains a naive truth predicate and a suitable conditional, one can define a validity predicate in accordance with the thesis that the inference from a conjunction of premises to a conclusion is valid when the corresponding conditional is true. The validity predicate so defined significantly increases our expressive resources and provides a coherent formal treatment of paradoxical arguments.

Naïve Truth and the Evidential Conditional

Andrea Iacona
First
;
Lorenzo Rossi
Last
2024-01-01

Abstract

This paper develops the idea that valid arguments are equivalent to true conditionals by combining Kripke’s theory of truth with the evidential account of conditionals offered by Crupi and Iacona. As will be shown, in a first-order language that contains a naive truth predicate and a suitable conditional, one can define a validity predicate in accordance with the thesis that the inference from a conjunction of premises to a conclusion is valid when the corresponding conditional is true. The validity predicate so defined significantly increases our expressive resources and provides a coherent formal treatment of paradoxical arguments.
2024
1
30
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10992-024-09749-4?utm_source=rct_congratemailt&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=oa_20240301&utm_content=10.1007/s10992-024-09749-4
Stoic Thesis, Naive truth, Evidential conditional, Semantic paradoxes
Andrea Iacona; Lorenzo Rossi
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/1959670
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