Is What We See in a Picture the Same as What the Picture Presents?

In this paper, first, I want to claim that, if an experience of seeing-in is a substantively cognitively penetrated form of perceptual experience, as Wollheim (2003a) claimed, then pace Brown (2010) and Hopkins (1998), what one sees in the picture coincides with what the picture presents, i.e., its figurative content. Secondly, I also want to claim that this coincidence does not mean that seeing-in turns out to be either a form of mental imagery or a form of imagination, even socially-based (e.g. in terms of make-believe games), as some people have claimed (Walton 1990, Dorsch 2016). For, as Wollheim repeatedly stressed, a seeing-in experience remains a sui generis perceptual experience; notably, a properly fusional twofold perceptual experience.