Rethinking modality-specificity in the cognitive neuroscience of concrete word meaning: a position paper

A core assumption in the current neurosemantic research is that meanings of concrete words (object nouns, action verbs) are at least partially grounded in modality-specific representations implemented by perceptual and motor cortices. Nevertheless, increasing evidence from the multisensory research suggests that extensive portions of what are traditionally considered modality-specific cortices are in fact supramodal in nature–that is, they can process specific information in multiple sensory modalities and in both normal and sensory-deprived individuals. My central argument in this paper is that the amount of data collected within the supramodal paradigm, although certainly not conclusive, is already robust enough to foster reflections about the role of modality-specificity in the semantic brain and to prompt considerations about the possibility of promoting a property-specific and modality-invariant turn in neurosemantics.