Risorse di governo e cambiamento di policy nel mercato del lavoro italiano. Who gets what? ....And, especially, how much?

This article addresses the following questions: how can we hypothesize the relationship between Italian governments and pressure groups, in «determining» welfare policies? How much governments are able to «get what they want», at the end of the decision-making process? How much pressure groups are influent in negotiating with policy-makers? By proposing an analytical model of interaction between governments and social partners, based respectively on actors’ means and resources and the influence played by the external context, I analyze two important Italian labour market reforms: the 1997 «Pacchetto per l’occupazione Treu» and the 2003 «legge Biagi». Although the reasons that led to these innovations are strongly path-dependent, similarities and differences between the two decision-making processes may be adequately interpreted by the analytical model proposed.