We estimate that hiring subsidies reduce concentration in labor markets where both small and large firms coexist. Wages increase only when HSs are in place and firms keep 96% of the subsidy amount, indicating that even small firms have relevant wage-setting power.
Monopsony and rent sharing: Evidence from Italian hiring subsidies
Pacelli L.
;Passerini F.
2024-01-01
Abstract
We estimate that hiring subsidies reduce concentration in labor markets where both small and large firms coexist. Wages increase only when HSs are in place and firms keep 96% of the subsidy amount, indicating that even small firms have relevant wage-setting power.
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