La morte medicalmente assistita e la tentazione dell’overruling: il significato ambiguo del trattamento di sostegno vitale

The Constitutional Court once again addresses the delicate issue (set out in the well-known judgment No. 242 of 2019, together with the previous one, No. 207 of 2018) of defining the conditions that make medically assisted death legal. Within a few years, the requirements outlined by the Court have gradually been perceived by some interpreters as unreasonably selective. Among these, the most debated is the patient's dependency on life-saving treatments: it is precisely this expression that is interpreted, in the decision under discussion, in a particularly broad and progressive way, to the point that it suggests that the Court's maneuvering space regarding end-of-life regulation has now been exhausted. From now on, any new intervention in this matter can only be carried out by the legislator, in the exercise of its political discretion.