Efficienza o inconcludenza? Alcune considerazioni giuseconomiche sull’autonomia differenziata

This essay provides a critical analysis of Law No. 86 of 2024 on differentiated autonomy, examining the efficiency assumptions underpinning the reform and highlighting potential paradoxes and negative effects on national cohesion, equity, and the overall efficiency of the system. Drawing on the arguments made by proponents of the reform in favor of devolving more powers to the Regions, the essay explores the potential downsides, such as the loss of economies of scale, increased administrative costs, the creation of distorting incentives, and the exacerbation of territorial disparities. These could lead to greater inefficiencies and inequalities, ultimately undermining the constitutional principles of national unity and solidarity. The paper also applies a giusoeconomic framework to analyze the justifications provided by the Piedmont Region for territorial differentiation, suggesting that this could result in an excessively discretionary approach, lacking shared guiding principles, and thereby risk undermining the coherence and uniformity of the regional system as a whole. A potential solution could involve the development of a more balanced model, based on strategic centralization of certain competences and targeted redistribution policies that maximize economic efficiency without sacrificing territorial equity. Otherwise, the risk is that differentiated autonomy—especially in regions like Piedmont—could exacerbate existing inequalities, with negative consequences for both the economy and the systemic and democratic stability of the country.