Su realismo e antirealismo nella Logica di Hegel

The paper pursues three main goals: first, to clarify the terms of the dispute between realism and antirealism in philosophy; second, to reconstruct Hegel's arguments on this topic; third, to show the theoretical (and thus not only historical) relevance of these arguments. I therefore proceed as follows: I first present the most robust version of philosophical realism, namely, metaphysical realism (2); I then reconstruct the point-by-point critique that Hegel advances against that position in his Logic (i.e., in that part of his system that provides the general coordinates for the comprehension of reality) (3); I present the antirealist alternative (4) and then point out the reasons that lead Hegel to reject that position as well (5); finally, I outline three hypotheses about the philosophical account defended by Hegel, but I leave it to another occasion to provide answers.