Amodal Completion: Imaginative or Perceptual?

In this paper, after trying to show why this solution of the problem of amodal completion does not work in any of its variants, I will claim that the experience of the object as a whole is genuinely perceptual as it seems. For I will appeal to a difference between a sensuous component, presentational character, and a non-sensuous component, feeling of presence, of the phenomenal character of that experience: while the hidden facets or the occluded parts of the experienced object do not contribute to the presentational character of the perceptual experience of thatobject, the fact that in the overall phenomenal character of one’s perceptual experience the object is non-sensuously felt as present explains why one perceptually experiences it as a whole. Finally, I will try to show how my account easily solves a paradox of perception, precisely by applying the distinction between presentational character and feeling of presence.