One question that arises in connection with Ockhamism, and that perhaps has not yet received the attention it deserves, is how a coherent formal account of truth ascriptions can be provided by using a suitable truth predicate in the object language. We address this question and show its implications for some semantic issues that have been discussed in the literature on future contingents. Arguably, understanding how truth ascriptions work at the formal level helps to gain a deeper insight into Ockhamism itself.
Future Actuality and Truth Ascriptions
Andrea Iacona
;
2025-01-01
Abstract
One question that arises in connection with Ockhamism, and that perhaps has not yet received the attention it deserves, is how a coherent formal account of truth ascriptions can be provided by using a suitable truth predicate in the object language. We address this question and show its implications for some semantic issues that have been discussed in the literature on future contingents. Arguably, understanding how truth ascriptions work at the formal level helps to gain a deeper insight into Ockhamism itself.
File in questo prodotto:
| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
FAaTA.pdf
Accesso aperto
Tipo di file:
PDF EDITORIALE
Dimensione
329.92 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
329.92 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
