In accordance with the principle of separation between State and Church, legal orders do not provide a definition of religion. Legal practitioners need, however, to distinguish what can be defined as religious from what is not, and, in the absence of precise hermeneutical canons, they refer to the models of the three great monotheisms (Christianity, Judaism and Islam). Today this approach is, however, undermined by the claims of those groups that deviate from the "traditional" religious model. Thus, facing the request of a Pastafarian to pose for an ID picture wearing a colander, the judicial authorities struggle to justify the refusal of this request without making an assessment of the merits of the group’s doctrinal patrimony. Moreover, with reference to the work done "affectionis vel benevolentiae causa" made by Damanhur to justify the lack of contributions to those members who have worked for the community, Italian courts waver and compare Damanhur followers to monks or Franciscan friars. Legal orders are thus contended between the need to guarantee an effective religious (and spiritual) pluralism and the inability to deviate from traditional models, leading the new religious (and spiritual) movements to ask themselves "why do they and we don’t?", without obtaining satisfactory answers.
Why do they and we don’t? The notion of religion in view of contemporary religious and spiritual pluralism
Monia Ciravegna
2021-01-01
Abstract
In accordance with the principle of separation between State and Church, legal orders do not provide a definition of religion. Legal practitioners need, however, to distinguish what can be defined as religious from what is not, and, in the absence of precise hermeneutical canons, they refer to the models of the three great monotheisms (Christianity, Judaism and Islam). Today this approach is, however, undermined by the claims of those groups that deviate from the "traditional" religious model. Thus, facing the request of a Pastafarian to pose for an ID picture wearing a colander, the judicial authorities struggle to justify the refusal of this request without making an assessment of the merits of the group’s doctrinal patrimony. Moreover, with reference to the work done "affectionis vel benevolentiae causa" made by Damanhur to justify the lack of contributions to those members who have worked for the community, Italian courts waver and compare Damanhur followers to monks or Franciscan friars. Legal orders are thus contended between the need to guarantee an effective religious (and spiritual) pluralism and the inability to deviate from traditional models, leading the new religious (and spiritual) movements to ask themselves "why do they and we don’t?", without obtaining satisfactory answers.
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