This chapter examines the complex dynamics at work between independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), trust, and populist pressures in democratic governance. Independent regulators are specialized public-sector organizations that operate autonomously from elected officials, ensuring consistent and impartial implementation of regulatory policies. Trust in these agencies is crucial for their effectiveness, encouraging compliance, and reducing the need for excessive oversight. However, trust must be balanced with a certain level of functional distrust, which fosters accountability and guards against abuses of power. The rise of populism introduces new challenges, as populist movements, often critical of institutions perceived as technocratic, tend to undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of IRAs by instrumentalizing distrust. Populist leaders may, in particular, perceive independent regulators as obstacles to their political agendas, leading to attempts to curtail their autonomy. Empirical examples, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency under the Trump administration, illustrate how populist pressures can reshape regulatory governance. In such instances, IRAs face threats to their independence, affecting policy continuity and the overall functioning of the regulatory regime. While IRAs remain generally trusted institutions for now, especially compared with other government bodies, the long-term effects of populist challenges require further investigation. The chapter calls for additional research to better understand how populist rhetoric and policies impact regulatory governance, as well as the performative role of IRAs’ autonomy. Balancing the autonomy of expert-based bureaucracies with democratic accountability remains essential to sustaining effective governance amidst growing populist influences.

Trust, populism, and the independence of regulatory agencies

Di Mascio, F.;
2025-01-01

Abstract

This chapter examines the complex dynamics at work between independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), trust, and populist pressures in democratic governance. Independent regulators are specialized public-sector organizations that operate autonomously from elected officials, ensuring consistent and impartial implementation of regulatory policies. Trust in these agencies is crucial for their effectiveness, encouraging compliance, and reducing the need for excessive oversight. However, trust must be balanced with a certain level of functional distrust, which fosters accountability and guards against abuses of power. The rise of populism introduces new challenges, as populist movements, often critical of institutions perceived as technocratic, tend to undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of IRAs by instrumentalizing distrust. Populist leaders may, in particular, perceive independent regulators as obstacles to their political agendas, leading to attempts to curtail their autonomy. Empirical examples, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency under the Trump administration, illustrate how populist pressures can reshape regulatory governance. In such instances, IRAs face threats to their independence, affecting policy continuity and the overall functioning of the regulatory regime. While IRAs remain generally trusted institutions for now, especially compared with other government bodies, the long-term effects of populist challenges require further investigation. The chapter calls for additional research to better understand how populist rhetoric and policies impact regulatory governance, as well as the performative role of IRAs’ autonomy. Balancing the autonomy of expert-based bureaucracies with democratic accountability remains essential to sustaining effective governance amidst growing populist influences.
2025
Handbook of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Politics, Resources, Power
Edward Elgar
212
221
9781803927039
Bureaucratic autonomy; Trust; Populism; Regulation; Regulatory Agencies
Maggetti, M.; Di Mascio, F.; Natalini, A.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/2107550
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