Wittgenstein, Egidi, and Intentionality

In this paper, I assess the middle Wittgenstein’s doctrine of intentionality as an internal relation between an intentional state and its object or (proposition- like) content, a doctrine that Wittgenstein immediately rejected in favor of a linguistically-based monadic approach to intentionality (Egidi 2023). This doctrine was rejected by Wittgenstein, likely because in his eyes it relied on a problematic conception of (merely) possible states of affairs and on the existence of the Tractarian obscure metaphysical subject as a transcendental condition for significance. I try to show how these problems may be circumvented. First, I appeal to a merely deflationary conception of possible states of affairs. Second, by further dispensing with the Tractatus’ atomistic postulate, I take intentionality as the internal relation for an intentional state, to be conceived as a relational trope, of being constituted by its object or content, i.e., of having such object/content as an essential part.