In its discussion of the traditional theory of truth Heidegger capsizes the thesis that stats the truth is in the judgement, affirming, on the contrary, that the judgement is in the truth. Yet Heidegger’s reference to Aristotle, in order to support this thesis, is contradicted by the passage where this one defines the apophantic discourse as a discourse “in which the true and the false exist”. The correct interpretation of the Aristotelian definition can nevertheless back up the Heideggerian thesis. In this paper I discuss above all the meaning of the expression hypárchein en tinì, that appears in the aforesaid definition, in connection with a very important place in the Categories, where the relation between first and second substances is defined; afterwards I try to show its difference as to the expression, often considered as equivalent, hypárchein tinì, that occurs particularly in the Analytics: the first one would indicate a sort of ontological antecedence, while the second one a relation of belonging; the first one is set on an antipredicative level, the second one on a predicative level. The usual translation of both these expressions with inesse in Medieval Age involved the reduction of the ontological relation to the logical one, opening the way to the Leibnizian theory of the implication of the predicate in the subject and to its consequent rationalism. On the contrary, the Aristotelian expression hypárchein en tinì should be considered as a relation non reducible to the predicative one: the Heidegger’s thesis “the judgement is in the truth” can thus be justified if the “in” is intended not in spacial terms but in temporal terms, namely in an existential sense, as in the expression “being-in-the-world”: what, in which a judgement is, is what precedes it ontologically, the truth. The truth is in the judgement then just in the same way as the Dasein is in the world. In the last part of the paper I try to show some interesting parallelisms with the Davidsonian theory, in particular with the idea according to which the truth is always referred to a speaker and involves a temporal reference and an ontological relation: in order to have a judgement, speakers should be there.
Die Antezedens der Wahrheit. Heidegger und die Aristotelische Definition der apophantischen Rede
CHIURAZZI, Gaetano
2007-01-01
Abstract
In its discussion of the traditional theory of truth Heidegger capsizes the thesis that stats the truth is in the judgement, affirming, on the contrary, that the judgement is in the truth. Yet Heidegger’s reference to Aristotle, in order to support this thesis, is contradicted by the passage where this one defines the apophantic discourse as a discourse “in which the true and the false exist”. The correct interpretation of the Aristotelian definition can nevertheless back up the Heideggerian thesis. In this paper I discuss above all the meaning of the expression hypárchein en tinì, that appears in the aforesaid definition, in connection with a very important place in the Categories, where the relation between first and second substances is defined; afterwards I try to show its difference as to the expression, often considered as equivalent, hypárchein tinì, that occurs particularly in the Analytics: the first one would indicate a sort of ontological antecedence, while the second one a relation of belonging; the first one is set on an antipredicative level, the second one on a predicative level. The usual translation of both these expressions with inesse in Medieval Age involved the reduction of the ontological relation to the logical one, opening the way to the Leibnizian theory of the implication of the predicate in the subject and to its consequent rationalism. On the contrary, the Aristotelian expression hypárchein en tinì should be considered as a relation non reducible to the predicative one: the Heidegger’s thesis “the judgement is in the truth” can thus be justified if the “in” is intended not in spacial terms but in temporal terms, namely in an existential sense, as in the expression “being-in-the-world”: what, in which a judgement is, is what precedes it ontologically, the truth. The truth is in the judgement then just in the same way as the Dasein is in the world. In the last part of the paper I try to show some interesting parallelisms with the Davidsonian theory, in particular with the idea according to which the truth is always referred to a speaker and involves a temporal reference and an ontological relation: in order to have a judgement, speakers should be there.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
