Traditionally, arguments in favour of fictional objects are given in semantical terms. One indeed generally argues that there is a portion of language, notably sentence involving (directly or indirectly) fiction, whose semantical account cannot dispense with fictional objects. For at least some singular terms in that portion of language denote precisely these entities. Yet any such argument risks to be threatened by the possibility of finding more and more radical anti-realist paraphrases of that portion. So, in what follows I will try to give a language-independent argument in favour of such entities, that is, an argument providing genuinely ontological reasons in favour of ficta. According to this argument, ficta are indispensable insofar as they are involved in the identity conditions of semantically-based entities we ordinarily accept, i.e. fictional works.

How Fictional Works Are Related to Fictional Entities

VOLTOLINI, Alberto
2003-01-01

Abstract

Traditionally, arguments in favour of fictional objects are given in semantical terms. One indeed generally argues that there is a portion of language, notably sentence involving (directly or indirectly) fiction, whose semantical account cannot dispense with fictional objects. For at least some singular terms in that portion of language denote precisely these entities. Yet any such argument risks to be threatened by the possibility of finding more and more radical anti-realist paraphrases of that portion. So, in what follows I will try to give a language-independent argument in favour of such entities, that is, an argument providing genuinely ontological reasons in favour of ficta. According to this argument, ficta are indispensable insofar as they are involved in the identity conditions of semantically-based entities we ordinarily accept, i.e. fictional works.
2003
57
225
238
http://www.philosophie.ch/dialectica/
fictional entities; fictional works; ontological argument
A. VOLTOLINI
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/55456
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact