Singular propositions as possible states of affairs

In this paper I will maintain that from a metaphysical point of view, singular propositions are nothing but possible states of affairs. This idea has various merits: it accounts for the spurious propositional character of singular propositions, it enables one to avoid Bradley’s regress, and, last but not least, it can vindicate one of the probably most obscure theses of Meinong, namely that objectives may be underfactual (untertatsächliche). Moreover, this metaphysical view of singular propositions will enable me to defend, from an ontological point of view, a deflationary view of singular propositions, along the way recently developed by Schiffer yet originally pursued by Wittgenstein precisely with respect to possible states of affairs: once we admit in our ontology both objects and modal properties, it is trivially the case that we also admit possible states of affairs, i.e., singular propositions.