How does an ideal language such that of Bergmann can account for our (inner) perception of time and change? More specifically, since the main axiom of Bergmann’s philosophy of time is that every moment is a specious present, how can an improved language capture a phenomenally vanishing experience such as the real cognized present? In other words, if, according to Bergmann’s fundamental Principle of Acquaintance, every simple constituent of the world – individual or character – has to be “wholly presented” in a specious present, then how can the direct acquaintance of a change can be transcribed in his ideal language since it entails relations among entities not completely separated in time, nor simultaneous? In “Duration and the Specious Present” (1960) Bergmann deals just with this problem. We argue that the problem, though Bergmann considers it “specific and minute”, is the core of his philosophy of time. However, in our opinion Bergmann’s solution is not satisfactory and the reason has to do with a misunderstanding of the very notion of specious present. In order to try answering to the above-mentioned questions we need, first, to map Bergmann’s time conception within his philosophical system until the early ‘60s and, second, to sketch a short theoretic schema of Bergmann’s ideal language (L) to show why L, according to the rules of its formation and interpretation, fails to give an account of the specious present’s experience. Prima facie the semantic weakness of L depends by the fact that, if we use ideal language’s method to describe changes within a single specious present, we are not able to avoid contradictions, and L turn to inconsistency. Our goal will be to trace back the reason of this technical problem to its real roots which are essentially philosophical rather than merely logical.
Some troubles with the specious present in Bergmann’s ideal language
2008-01-01
Abstract
How does an ideal language such that of Bergmann can account for our (inner) perception of time and change? More specifically, since the main axiom of Bergmann’s philosophy of time is that every moment is a specious present, how can an improved language capture a phenomenally vanishing experience such as the real cognized present? In other words, if, according to Bergmann’s fundamental Principle of Acquaintance, every simple constituent of the world – individual or character – has to be “wholly presented” in a specious present, then how can the direct acquaintance of a change can be transcribed in his ideal language since it entails relations among entities not completely separated in time, nor simultaneous? In “Duration and the Specious Present” (1960) Bergmann deals just with this problem. We argue that the problem, though Bergmann considers it “specific and minute”, is the core of his philosophy of time. However, in our opinion Bergmann’s solution is not satisfactory and the reason has to do with a misunderstanding of the very notion of specious present. In order to try answering to the above-mentioned questions we need, first, to map Bergmann’s time conception within his philosophical system until the early ‘60s and, second, to sketch a short theoretic schema of Bergmann’s ideal language (L) to show why L, according to the rules of its formation and interpretation, fails to give an account of the specious present’s experience. Prima facie the semantic weakness of L depends by the fact that, if we use ideal language’s method to describe changes within a single specious present, we are not able to avoid contradictions, and L turn to inconsistency. Our goal will be to trace back the reason of this technical problem to its real roots which are essentially philosophical rather than merely logical.
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