I discuss the merits of an argument (which can already be found in Wittgenstein's Tractatus) against the existence of necessary facts, i.e. of propositions that are both necessary and true a posteriori. I examine different strategies aiming to invalidate the argument. I show that no strategy is entirely successful.

Wittgenstein and necessary facts

MARCONI, Diego
2010-01-01

Abstract

I discuss the merits of an argument (which can already be found in Wittgenstein's Tractatus) against the existence of necessary facts, i.e. of propositions that are both necessary and true a posteriori. I examine different strategies aiming to invalidate the argument. I show that no strategy is entirely successful.
2010
Wittgenstein: Mind, Meaning and Metaphilosophy
Palgrave MacMillan
140
166
9780230219410
Wittgenstein; Kripke; modality; conceivability; necessity; a posteriori
D Marconi
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/76361
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