I discuss the merits of an argument (which can already be found in Wittgenstein's Tractatus) against the existence of necessary facts, i.e. of propositions that are both necessary and true a posteriori. I examine different strategies aiming to invalidate the argument. I show that no strategy is entirely successful.
Wittgenstein and necessary facts
MARCONI, Diego
2010-01-01
Abstract
I discuss the merits of an argument (which can already be found in Wittgenstein's Tractatus) against the existence of necessary facts, i.e. of propositions that are both necessary and true a posteriori. I examine different strategies aiming to invalidate the argument. I show that no strategy is entirely successful.File in questo prodotto:
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