Creditworthiness and trustworthiness are almost synonyms because, under asymmetric information, the act of conferring a loan has the indirect effect of signaling the trustworthiness of the borrower. We test the creditworthiness/trustworthiness nexus in an investment game experiment on a sample of participants/non-participants in a microfinance program in Argentina and find that trustors give significantly more to (and believe they will receive more from) microfinance borrowers. The first- and second-order beliefs of trustees are also consistent with this picture. Our findings then show that MF participants appear more trustworthy and this may help microfinance to work. A related consequence is that, if (and only if) borrower's trustworthiness is not public information, the mere loan provision acts as a reputation enhancing signal increasing the borrower's attractiveness as a business partner. In such case we have a channel through which a private financial intermediary contributes to the provision of a public good like information, thereby reducing the adverse consequences of market failures on the creation of economic value.

Enhancing capabilities through credit access: Creditworthiness as a signal of trustworthiness under asymmetric information

CONZO, Pierluigi
2011

Abstract

Creditworthiness and trustworthiness are almost synonyms because, under asymmetric information, the act of conferring a loan has the indirect effect of signaling the trustworthiness of the borrower. We test the creditworthiness/trustworthiness nexus in an investment game experiment on a sample of participants/non-participants in a microfinance program in Argentina and find that trustors give significantly more to (and believe they will receive more from) microfinance borrowers. The first- and second-order beliefs of trustees are also consistent with this picture. Our findings then show that MF participants appear more trustworthy and this may help microfinance to work. A related consequence is that, if (and only if) borrower's trustworthiness is not public information, the mere loan provision acts as a reputation enhancing signal increasing the borrower's attractiveness as a business partner. In such case we have a channel through which a private financial intermediary contributes to the provision of a public good like information, thereby reducing the adverse consequences of market failures on the creation of economic value.
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http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272710001829
Field experiment; Microfinance; Investment game; Trust; Trustworthiness
L. Becchetti; P. Conzo
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/2318/120142
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