This article shows how the frequent occurrence of seeing exceedingly high claims in disputes and litigations can be rationalized by a model in which claimants display reference dependent preferences, expect the judge to use a generalized social welfare function, and strategically announce their reference points.
Strategic announcements of reference points in disputes and litigations
GALLICE, Andrea Pier Giovanni
2012-01-01
Abstract
This article shows how the frequent occurrence of seeing exceedingly high claims in disputes and litigations can be rationalized by a model in which claimants display reference dependent preferences, expect the judge to use a generalized social welfare function, and strategically announce their reference points.
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