The only interesting fact about the concept of ‘composite substance’, as far as the Monadology is concerned, is that, as anyone can easily assess, it is not present in this writing. The concept is nevertheless present in contemporary writings like the Principles of Nature and Grace, where it appears at the very beginning and indeed has a central role. It is still present in writings of the following years; it still appears in the last letter of Leibniz’s correspondence with Des Bosses, end 1716. One might thus wonder whether in the Monadology we are merely confronted with a passing obliviousness; if not, one might ask: is this a ‘symptom’, i.e. a sign of so- mething relevant? Leibniz's attempts here to describe his cosmology with two key concepts, none of which is ‘substance’; alongside with the necessary being providing harmony, and harmony taking the place of ‘real’ union, the center of the terminological stage is taken by ‘universe’ and ‘living’, or ‘living being’. Together with his changing attitude towards continuity, as the other ingredient to his late – maybe final – theoretic shift, it shows that at the time of the Monadology Leibniz is privately trying to move from his prior Aristotelian toolbox to a more formal, more general, we might even say more ‘phenomenological’ toolbox.
The Concept of ‘Composite Substance’ and other Absences in the Monadology
PASINI, Enrico
2017-01-01
Abstract
The only interesting fact about the concept of ‘composite substance’, as far as the Monadology is concerned, is that, as anyone can easily assess, it is not present in this writing. The concept is nevertheless present in contemporary writings like the Principles of Nature and Grace, where it appears at the very beginning and indeed has a central role. It is still present in writings of the following years; it still appears in the last letter of Leibniz’s correspondence with Des Bosses, end 1716. One might thus wonder whether in the Monadology we are merely confronted with a passing obliviousness; if not, one might ask: is this a ‘symptom’, i.e. a sign of so- mething relevant? Leibniz's attempts here to describe his cosmology with two key concepts, none of which is ‘substance’; alongside with the necessary being providing harmony, and harmony taking the place of ‘real’ union, the center of the terminological stage is taken by ‘universe’ and ‘living’, or ‘living being’. Together with his changing attitude towards continuity, as the other ingredient to his late – maybe final – theoretic shift, it shows that at the time of the Monadology Leibniz is privately trying to move from his prior Aristotelian toolbox to a more formal, more general, we might even say more ‘phenomenological’ toolbox.
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