Myanmar transition to democracy may appear sudden and spectacular. Such a blatant change prompts questions: what made the transition possible? How deep and stable is it? Where Myanmar will go from here? In order to address these broad questions in a concise manner a convenient frame of reference is provided by Samuel Huntington's "third wave democratization" (1991). The main reason to rely on Huntington for this analysis is that he included Myanmar in the third wave, but then discarded it as a failed transition after the violent crushing of the popular uprisings of 1988 and the cancellation of the 1990 election results. As his Third Wave book was published in 1991, he could not afford the luxury of stretching his analysis farther in time. But from the vantage point of 2018 we can see how those events did not bring Myanmar’s transition to an end, but rather aligned it with a pace and depth palatable to the ruling elite. In this perspective, Myanmar can be considered the slowest democratizing country of the third wave. The choice of Huntington's theoretical approach for conducting this analysis is further supported by three more reasons. First, it allows us to separate and streamline structural reasons for change from proximate factors. Second, it places great emphasis on transitions from military regimes, thus relating easily with Myanmar's case. Third, it takes into account the issue of regime consolidation considering not only transition-related problems but also chronic concerns affecting a country and their feedback effects on the stability of the new regime.

Myanmar

Stefano Ruzza;Giuseppe Gabusi
2018-01-01

Abstract

Myanmar transition to democracy may appear sudden and spectacular. Such a blatant change prompts questions: what made the transition possible? How deep and stable is it? Where Myanmar will go from here? In order to address these broad questions in a concise manner a convenient frame of reference is provided by Samuel Huntington's "third wave democratization" (1991). The main reason to rely on Huntington for this analysis is that he included Myanmar in the third wave, but then discarded it as a failed transition after the violent crushing of the popular uprisings of 1988 and the cancellation of the 1990 election results. As his Third Wave book was published in 1991, he could not afford the luxury of stretching his analysis farther in time. But from the vantage point of 2018 we can see how those events did not bring Myanmar’s transition to an end, but rather aligned it with a pace and depth palatable to the ruling elite. In this perspective, Myanmar can be considered the slowest democratizing country of the third wave. The choice of Huntington's theoretical approach for conducting this analysis is further supported by three more reasons. First, it allows us to separate and streamline structural reasons for change from proximate factors. Second, it places great emphasis on transitions from military regimes, thus relating easily with Myanmar's case. Third, it takes into account the issue of regime consolidation considering not only transition-related problems but also chronic concerns affecting a country and their feedback effects on the stability of the new regime.
2018
The Elgar Companion to Post-Conflict Transition
Edward Elgar Publishing
275
293
978-1-78347-904-7
Myanmar, Transition, Democratization, Autocracy, Military rule
Stefano Ruzza; Giuseppe Gabusi
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/1710888
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact