Experimental economics uses response times as a tool to evaluate the instinctiveness of choices and behaviours. They have been used to define types of subjects, but never to evaluate the stability of such types. This paper defines stability of types in terms of the variability exhibited by the choices made by an individual in a repeated experiment. The analysis of response times and type stability shows that stability is more instinctive than instability, supporting the idea that types exist and that deviations require cognitive effort.

Some Experimental Evidence on Type Stability and Response Times

Gianna Lotito;Matteo Migheli;Guido Ortona
2019-01-01

Abstract

Experimental economics uses response times as a tool to evaluate the instinctiveness of choices and behaviours. They have been used to define types of subjects, but never to evaluate the stability of such types. This paper defines stability of types in terms of the variability exhibited by the choices made by an individual in a repeated experiment. The analysis of response times and type stability shows that stability is more instinctive than instability, supporting the idea that types exist and that deviations require cognitive effort.
2019
Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica "Cognetti de Martiis"
19/2019
1
27
https://www.est.unito.it/do/home.pl/View?doc=WP_Dipartimento.html
types; stability; response times; public goods experiment
Gianna Lotito, Matteo Migheli, Guido Ortona
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/1728870
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