The phenomenon of semantic satiation has been put forward recently as a way of showing that we can hear meanings or semantic properties, which are high-level properties expressed in a language we understand. Arguments in support of this claim stem from the fact that semantic satiation is a form of sensory adaptation; sensory adaptation has already been used successfully to show that we can perceive high-level properties, so, in theory, semantic satiation can also be used to show that we can hear meanings or semantic properties. In this paper, I assess cases of phenomenological contrast in the literature that purport to show that we can perceive meaning. I argue that only the contrast case designed specifically about semantic satiation can successfully decide whether the before-after difference is perceptual. I also focus on auditory adaptation to gendered voices, which is a perceptual phenomenon, and compare it to semantic satiation. I argue that semantic satiation due to excessive exposure to a spoken word cannot be considered a perceptual phenomenon, since it differs from auditory adaptation to gendered voice in many respects. My conclusion is that semantic satiation cannot be used to show that we can hear meaning. Therefore, we need other cases to prove that semantic properties expressed in a language we understand can enter the content of auditory perception.
On Hearing Meanings: Reflections on the Method of Contrast, Adaptational Effects, and Semantic Satiation
Elvira Di Bona
2020-01-01
Abstract
The phenomenon of semantic satiation has been put forward recently as a way of showing that we can hear meanings or semantic properties, which are high-level properties expressed in a language we understand. Arguments in support of this claim stem from the fact that semantic satiation is a form of sensory adaptation; sensory adaptation has already been used successfully to show that we can perceive high-level properties, so, in theory, semantic satiation can also be used to show that we can hear meanings or semantic properties. In this paper, I assess cases of phenomenological contrast in the literature that purport to show that we can perceive meaning. I argue that only the contrast case designed specifically about semantic satiation can successfully decide whether the before-after difference is perceptual. I also focus on auditory adaptation to gendered voices, which is a perceptual phenomenon, and compare it to semantic satiation. I argue that semantic satiation due to excessive exposure to a spoken word cannot be considered a perceptual phenomenon, since it differs from auditory adaptation to gendered voice in many respects. My conclusion is that semantic satiation cannot be used to show that we can hear meaning. Therefore, we need other cases to prove that semantic properties expressed in a language we understand can enter the content of auditory perception.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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