In this paper we establish a new connection between a class of two-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping and certain two-player nonzero-sum games of singular control. We show that whenever a Nash equilibrium in the game of stopping is attained by hitting times at two separate boundaries, then such boundaries also trigger a Nash equilibrium in the game of singular control. Moreover, a differential link between the players' value functions holds across the two games.
Stochastic nonzero-sum games: A new connection between singular control and optimal stopping
De Angelis T.;
2018-01-01
Abstract
In this paper we establish a new connection between a class of two-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping and certain two-player nonzero-sum games of singular control. We show that whenever a Nash equilibrium in the game of stopping is attained by hitting times at two separate boundaries, then such boundaries also trigger a Nash equilibrium in the game of singular control. Moreover, a differential link between the players' value functions holds across the two games.
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