In this paper I address the issues raised by Daniele Fulvi, by focusing on the alleged anthropocentrism of my approach to kenotic thought. I defend ontological anthropocentrism (as opposed to ethical anthropocentrism), arguing that a qualified ontological anthropocentrism is not only inevitable, but also more appropriate in order to think of nature in the context of kenotic thought. Subsequently, I address the question of the relation between kenosis and truth, and the issue of how kenotic thought could, and should, relate to nature. I conclude by arguing that only by conceiving truth as mediated is it possible to develop a kenotic approach to nature that has the potential to contribute fruitfully to environmental ethics.

Kenosis, Nature, and Anthropocentrism: A Response to Fulvi

Bubbio, PD
2022-01-01

Abstract

In this paper I address the issues raised by Daniele Fulvi, by focusing on the alleged anthropocentrism of my approach to kenotic thought. I defend ontological anthropocentrism (as opposed to ethical anthropocentrism), arguing that a qualified ontological anthropocentrism is not only inevitable, but also more appropriate in order to think of nature in the context of kenotic thought. Subsequently, I address the question of the relation between kenosis and truth, and the issue of how kenotic thought could, and should, relate to nature. I conclude by arguing that only by conceiving truth as mediated is it possible to develop a kenotic approach to nature that has the potential to contribute fruitfully to environmental ethics.
2022
14
3
205
216
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17570638.2022.2146062?needAccess=true&journalCode=yccp20
Kenosis; nature; anthropocentrism; Bubbio
Bubbio, PD
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/1883702
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