Introspection and the Transparency of Experience

This chapter focuses on the controversies surrounding the transparency of experience (or simply transparency), an (alleged) introspective datum that has played a central role in debates on the nature of perceptual experience and phenomenal consciousness. The main emphasis is on issues arising in relation to transparency and introspection, though its significance for the metaphysics of experience is also stressed. First, the chapter outlines Harman’s and Tye’s characterization of transparency and the conclusions they draw about the metaphysics of experience. Next, it discusses the relation between this characterization and introspection by addressing two central questions: first, what picture of introspection is suggested by Harman’s and Tye’s transparency thesis? Second, does introspection genuinely support this thesis? The discussion reveals that Harman’s and Tye’s characterization of transparency relies on substantial and controversial theoretical assumptions that go beyond what can be established on purely (or largely) introspective grounds. In this way, the chapter highlights the main points of disagreement about transparency and, when relevant, their implications for the metaphysics of experience. It concludes by sketching a way of structuring the debate and raising further questions about the genuine pre-theoretical core of transparency and why theoretical supplementation plays such a pivotal role.