In this contribution we pursue the study of the Bi-level Interdiction Knapsack Problem, where a leader interdicts some knapsack items subject to a budget constraint in order to maximally reduce the total profit of the Knapsack Problem that the follower solves on the remaining items. We study the computational complexity of the problem when the leader’s interdiction costs are unitary and prove that the problem remains Σ2p-complete using a reduction from the bi-level 3-SAT problem. Additionally, we prove that the version with unitary lower level weights but arbitrary interdiction costs is NP-complete.

Complexity Results on the Bi-Level Interdiction Knapsack Problem with Unit Interdiction Costs or Unit Weights

Hosteins Pierre
2026-01-01

Abstract

In this contribution we pursue the study of the Bi-level Interdiction Knapsack Problem, where a leader interdicts some knapsack items subject to a budget constraint in order to maximally reduce the total profit of the Knapsack Problem that the follower solves on the remaining items. We study the computational complexity of the problem when the leader’s interdiction costs are unitary and prove that the problem remains Σ2p-complete using a reduction from the bi-level 3-SAT problem. Additionally, we prove that the version with unitary lower level weights but arbitrary interdiction costs is NP-complete.
2026
International Conference on Optimization and Decision Science 2024
Badesi, Italia
8/9/2024-12/9/2024
AIRO Springer Series: Operations Research: Closing the Gap Between Research and Practice
Massimo Di Francesco, Enrico Gorgone, Benedetto Manca, Simone Zanda
15
195
204
9783031900945
9783031900952
Bi-level Knapsack; Interdiction; Polynomial hierarchy; Stackelberg game
Boggio Tomasaz Alberto; Carvalho Margarida; Cordone Roberto; Hosteins Pierre
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Hosteins_ODS2024.pdf

Accesso aperto con embargo fino al 01/01/2028

Tipo di file: PDF EDITORIALE
Dimensione 223.28 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
223.28 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/2127590
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 0
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact