We study a population of individuals playing the prisoner's dilemma game. Individual strategies are invariable but the network of relationships between players is allowed to change over time following simple rules based on the players' degree of satisfaction. In the long run, cooperators tend to cluster together in order to maintain a high average payoff and to protect themselves from exploiting defectors. We investigated both synchronous and asynchronous network dynamics, observing that asynchronous update leads to more stable states, and is more tolerant to various kinds of perturbations in the system.

Emergence of Structure and Stability in Prisoner's Dilemma on Networks

GIACOBINI, Mario Dante Lucio;
2005-01-01

Abstract

We study a population of individuals playing the prisoner's dilemma game. Individual strategies are invariable but the network of relationships between players is allowed to change over time following simple rules based on the players' degree of satisfaction. In the long run, cooperators tend to cluster together in order to maintain a high average payoff and to protect themselves from exploiting defectors. We investigated both synchronous and asynchronous network dynamics, observing that asynchronous update leads to more stable states, and is more tolerant to various kinds of perturbations in the system.
2005
Advances in Artificial Life: 8th European Conference, ECAL 2005
Canterbury, UK
September 2005
Proceedings of the 8th European Conference, ECAL 2005
SPringer Verlag
3630
665
674
evolutionary game theory; structured population; irregular graph; scale free; small world; robustness
Luthi, L; Giacobini, Mario Dante Lucio; Tomassini, M.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/5466
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