In this paper I discuss the role of sharedness in intersubjectivity from a developmental point of view. I argue in favor of a distinction between reciprocity in communication and collective action, maintaining that only the first is a peculiar feature of humans since their birth. My argument is based on the discussion of recent studies presenting experiments with children and chimpanzees. I suggest that establishing a distinction among communication, collective action and shared action is the only way to give account of the basic difference existing between human and nonhuman primates concerning intersubjectivity. My conclusion is that the bases of human intersubjectivity are also the cognitive bases of communication.
Reciprocity, communication and collective action
AIRENTI, Gabriella
2009-01-01
Abstract
In this paper I discuss the role of sharedness in intersubjectivity from a developmental point of view. I argue in favor of a distinction between reciprocity in communication and collective action, maintaining that only the first is a peculiar feature of humans since their birth. My argument is based on the discussion of recent studies presenting experiments with children and chimpanzees. I suggest that establishing a distinction among communication, collective action and shared action is the only way to give account of the basic difference existing between human and nonhuman primates concerning intersubjectivity. My conclusion is that the bases of human intersubjectivity are also the cognitive bases of communication.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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