After two passionate and high-intensity media competitions like those in 2001 and 2006, the 2008 general election campaign appeared much less lively and involving than the previous ones. While according to several observers (Diamanti 2008; Feltrin and Natale, 2008; Ignazi 2008; Mannheimer and Natale, 2008) the 2008 election might have proved to be a truly critical one, there was no hard media campaigning in the immediate run up to it. As we will see in the following paragraphs, this was true both from the standpoint of journalistic coverage (which was, on the whole, limited and weak) and with regard to the politicians’ use of the media (that was quantitatively smaller and qualitatively less exciting than in other cases). The result was that, after a notably lacklustre campaign, nobody expected that the country that just two years before was – at least apparently – equally split would give an advantage of more than twelve points to the centre-right coalition, even though the victory of PDL was widely regarded as a foregone conclusion (Sani, 2008). Several factors conspired to produce this result, starting from the fact that the campaign had only a limited appeal for the media. Firstly, because it lacked the atmosphere of expectation that is usually created by the long cycle linking successive general elections (Marletti, 2006) through a continuous series of intermediate ones. And because it also lacked the suspense produced by an unexpected recovery of the candidate who has the odds against him. A further reason for the lack of interest was that the political actors only seldom produced those appealing events that grab journalists’ attention, but need large resources in terms of time and organisation. That is to say exactly what was in very short supply during the ‘concentrated’ 2008 campaign, which was not prepared by the about two years ‘long’ promotion that had occurred both in 2001 and 2006. The low-intensity media campaign did not imply however that the political communication system played no relevant role. We can reasonably suppose that it did, but in a slower and less direct way, having helped, through its framing activity and its coverage of issues such as security, to set the agenda according to which voters would make their choices. In order take the analysis further, the remainder of this chapter will focus on three main aspects. First we will consider the limited visibility of the campaign in the media and the climate of opinion in which the competition was played out. Second we will further describe the main political actors’ communication strategies and their effects on the media coverage. Finally, the electoral agenda and the voting frames will be considered.
The Low-Intensity Media Campaign and a Vote That Comes from Far Back
RONCAROLO, Franca
2009-01-01
Abstract
After two passionate and high-intensity media competitions like those in 2001 and 2006, the 2008 general election campaign appeared much less lively and involving than the previous ones. While according to several observers (Diamanti 2008; Feltrin and Natale, 2008; Ignazi 2008; Mannheimer and Natale, 2008) the 2008 election might have proved to be a truly critical one, there was no hard media campaigning in the immediate run up to it. As we will see in the following paragraphs, this was true both from the standpoint of journalistic coverage (which was, on the whole, limited and weak) and with regard to the politicians’ use of the media (that was quantitatively smaller and qualitatively less exciting than in other cases). The result was that, after a notably lacklustre campaign, nobody expected that the country that just two years before was – at least apparently – equally split would give an advantage of more than twelve points to the centre-right coalition, even though the victory of PDL was widely regarded as a foregone conclusion (Sani, 2008). Several factors conspired to produce this result, starting from the fact that the campaign had only a limited appeal for the media. Firstly, because it lacked the atmosphere of expectation that is usually created by the long cycle linking successive general elections (Marletti, 2006) through a continuous series of intermediate ones. And because it also lacked the suspense produced by an unexpected recovery of the candidate who has the odds against him. A further reason for the lack of interest was that the political actors only seldom produced those appealing events that grab journalists’ attention, but need large resources in terms of time and organisation. That is to say exactly what was in very short supply during the ‘concentrated’ 2008 campaign, which was not prepared by the about two years ‘long’ promotion that had occurred both in 2001 and 2006. The low-intensity media campaign did not imply however that the political communication system played no relevant role. We can reasonably suppose that it did, but in a slower and less direct way, having helped, through its framing activity and its coverage of issues such as security, to set the agenda according to which voters would make their choices. In order take the analysis further, the remainder of this chapter will focus on three main aspects. First we will consider the limited visibility of the campaign in the media and the climate of opinion in which the competition was played out. Second we will further describe the main political actors’ communication strategies and their effects on the media coverage. Finally, the electoral agenda and the voting frames will be considered.
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