Over the past ten years, the governance of the international financial system has been significantly expanded with the introduction of new forms of interstate cooperation. The thickening of international financial governance is probably most evident in the creation of two international bodies, the FSB and the G20, which came to occupy the sphere of activity of an existing international body, i.e. the IMF. Building on this observation, this paper investigates the motivation that led member states to delegate functions and accord discretion to the FSB and the G20. In doing so, the paper tests the validity of a number of hypotheses developed from PA models in order to assess whether they fully explanatory or whether they should be complemented with more sociological-oriented insights. Reviewing and comparing the functions delegated and the discretion allocated to the FSB and the G20, the empirical findings show that members have delegated functions to the FSB that correspond closely to the functions predicted by PA models, but that delegation to the G20 appears to be driven also by concerns over representation and legitimacy. With regard to discretion, the empirical evidence suggests that the variation in the pattern of discretion reflects the extent of control principals may exercise over the agent. The homogeneity of the principals, together with an ongoing concern about the speed and efficiency of decision-making, also help explain the pattern of discretion accorded to the FSB and the G20.
Delegation to and Discretion for the Financial Stability Board and the G20: Transaction Costs or Legitimacy Concerns?, GARNET Working paper N. 75/10
MOSCHELLA, Manuela
2010-01-01
Abstract
Over the past ten years, the governance of the international financial system has been significantly expanded with the introduction of new forms of interstate cooperation. The thickening of international financial governance is probably most evident in the creation of two international bodies, the FSB and the G20, which came to occupy the sphere of activity of an existing international body, i.e. the IMF. Building on this observation, this paper investigates the motivation that led member states to delegate functions and accord discretion to the FSB and the G20. In doing so, the paper tests the validity of a number of hypotheses developed from PA models in order to assess whether they fully explanatory or whether they should be complemented with more sociological-oriented insights. Reviewing and comparing the functions delegated and the discretion allocated to the FSB and the G20, the empirical findings show that members have delegated functions to the FSB that correspond closely to the functions predicted by PA models, but that delegation to the G20 appears to be driven also by concerns over representation and legitimacy. With regard to discretion, the empirical evidence suggests that the variation in the pattern of discretion reflects the extent of control principals may exercise over the agent. The homogeneity of the principals, together with an ongoing concern about the speed and efficiency of decision-making, also help explain the pattern of discretion accorded to the FSB and the G20.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
