In this paper we present a new framework to analyze the behavior of evolutionary 2x2 symmetric games. The proposed approach enables us to predict the dynamics of the system using the parameters of the game matrix above, without dealing with the concepts of Nash equilibria and evolutionary stable strategies. The predictions are in complete accordance with those that can be made with these latter concepts. Simulations have been performed on populations with spatial structures, and show a good agreement with the model's predictions. We also analyze the dynamics of a particular system, showing how effectively the framework applies to it.
A New Framework to Analyze Evolutionary 2x2 Symmetric Games
CERRUTI, Umberto;GIACOBINI, Mario Dante Lucio;MERLONE, Ugo
2005-01-01
Abstract
In this paper we present a new framework to analyze the behavior of evolutionary 2x2 symmetric games. The proposed approach enables us to predict the dynamics of the system using the parameters of the game matrix above, without dealing with the concepts of Nash equilibria and evolutionary stable strategies. The predictions are in complete accordance with those that can be made with these latter concepts. Simulations have been performed on populations with spatial structures, and show a good agreement with the model's predictions. We also analyze the dynamics of a particular system, showing how effectively the framework applies to it.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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