The contemporary debate on social ontology (Gallotti and Michael 2014) is largely aimed at the ontological definition of social entities and at the definition of the conditions of possibility for the representation of such objects. The main objective of any project of social ontology, therefore, has to be rooted in understanding what social objects are, that is, in finding the exact location of social objects is in a hypothetical "catalogue of the world" (Laycock 2011). In the perspective of the project "Human Apparatuses" (hereafter HA), social objects are understood as socially constructed but also as “based” on moral objects, which HA separates from the social ones by proposing a specific type of classification. Similarly, social reality is understood in general as a practice that supports the creation and preservation of social objects based prima facie on the institutionalization of moral ones. Social reality is not in itself an ethical or political structure, although some theories about its construction would seem to include evaluations about ethics and politics. The thesis of my project, in fact, is that when we discuss social ontology we use, more or less implicitly, certain patterns of human nature with clear ethical and normative implications. The problem is that, in the case of social objects, we often use the same categories both to refer to objects with no connotation of ethics and politics, and to refer to objects filled with such connotation. Opposing this conceptual confusion caused by linguistic imprecision, HA explicitly aims not to treat social objects as neutral events but to take into account their ethical, political and therefore normative sense. In the perspective of HA, the references to the debate on social ontology are therefore functional to the project of an ontology that is able to identify the ethical, legal, political and cultural implications of its assumptions. Part of this thesis comes from the discussion, within my project, of empathy as the basic unit for the representation of social objects – not only in its neutral psychological connotations (the ability to represent something other than oneself, see Gallese 2003; Lamm, Batson and Decety, 2007), but also in its minimal moral connotations (natural propensity to feel the actions of the other as one's own - de Waal 2008; Caffo 2014a). The HA project is articulated in three phases. The first stage is a critical survey of the debate on social ontology mainly (but not exclusively) in analytic philosophy. The main authors discussed are those that have made the history of social ontology: Lewis (1969), Gilbert (1996), Searle (2010), Ferraris (2012), Tuomela (2013) and Smith (2014). HA argues in favour of the thesis of documentality expressed by Ferraris and Smith (see also Caffo and Ferraris 2014), according to which social objects are institutionalized by documents, that is, by written acts. However, HA posits that this approach is correct only in relation to complex social situations (states, universities, etc.). Against Searle and his collective intentionality, HA proposes to understand empathy as an entity explaining the natural processes of construction of social reality in humans through a parallel with the structure of syntax in Chomsky (1957). The thesis I will try to articulate in this first phase of the project is that social objects are an institutionalization of moral objects, naturally arisen from empathic phenomena. They are the condition of possibility for the complex social realities well explained ontologically by theses related to documentality. My project, in this first phase, will try to construct the conditions of possibility for the argument that the more a social reality is constructed in accordance with the natural functioning of empathy, the more correct is its functioning (and the more morally acceptable is its normative and ethical system). The ultimate goal of this phase, therefore, is to argue for a basic empathy / normativity relation (Jensen, Vaish and Schmidt 2014). The second phase of my project will be devoted to a discussion of the implications and arguments set out in the first phase of HA. I think it necessary to highlight the ethical and political consequences of a social ontology in the sense of HA. First, I will clarify the meaning of the term "embodied social ontology" arguing, again in analogy with language, that the structures of empathy – as in language, see the example identified by Bickerton (1981) – tend to make more natural and ontologically simpler certain social situations (in analogy with "languages") and not others. I will also highlight the non-neutral character of regarding empathy as necessary for the representation of social objects: the more a social reality controls items that institutionalize division (at this stage I will also discuss the non-anthropocentric philosophical notion of "otherness" in Derrida 2002, see Caffo 2014b) and social conflict ("war", for example) the more this social reality is to be considered not only morally unacceptable, but unnatural and contrary to the very conditions of the construction of social contexts. The third stage is devoted to the political implications of social ontology as it is approached in HA. It is necessary to propose, even within social ontology, the distinction between interpretation and overinterpretation expressed by Eco (1992): even social objects, in fact, set limits to their possible interpretations. Such limits are set by their moral ancestors discussed in the first stage of HA, which highlights that the inherently normative matrix of social objects. In the final phase of the project I will try to discuss the natural political inclination of social ontology as a kind of higher-order theory, supported by social ontology. My project will therefore end with the mapping of different political models based on the respective ontological/ social assumptions, arguing in favour of models of anarchist inspiration (Wolff 1970) as natural extenders of empathy, which is the ancestor of social reality philosophically articulated in the first stage of HA. The auspice of my project is to suggest that the ontological structure identified in the case of social reality may also explain the nature of other cultural productions such as political and legal entities. As a pragmatic normative type, the social object may serve as a paradigm for an ontology of culture that aims to explain portions of social reality much broader than the domain of local social realities.
Apparato umano: un’ontologia sociale incarnata
CAFFO, LEONARDO
2015-01-01
Abstract
The contemporary debate on social ontology (Gallotti and Michael 2014) is largely aimed at the ontological definition of social entities and at the definition of the conditions of possibility for the representation of such objects. The main objective of any project of social ontology, therefore, has to be rooted in understanding what social objects are, that is, in finding the exact location of social objects is in a hypothetical "catalogue of the world" (Laycock 2011). In the perspective of the project "Human Apparatuses" (hereafter HA), social objects are understood as socially constructed but also as “based” on moral objects, which HA separates from the social ones by proposing a specific type of classification. Similarly, social reality is understood in general as a practice that supports the creation and preservation of social objects based prima facie on the institutionalization of moral ones. Social reality is not in itself an ethical or political structure, although some theories about its construction would seem to include evaluations about ethics and politics. The thesis of my project, in fact, is that when we discuss social ontology we use, more or less implicitly, certain patterns of human nature with clear ethical and normative implications. The problem is that, in the case of social objects, we often use the same categories both to refer to objects with no connotation of ethics and politics, and to refer to objects filled with such connotation. Opposing this conceptual confusion caused by linguistic imprecision, HA explicitly aims not to treat social objects as neutral events but to take into account their ethical, political and therefore normative sense. In the perspective of HA, the references to the debate on social ontology are therefore functional to the project of an ontology that is able to identify the ethical, legal, political and cultural implications of its assumptions. Part of this thesis comes from the discussion, within my project, of empathy as the basic unit for the representation of social objects – not only in its neutral psychological connotations (the ability to represent something other than oneself, see Gallese 2003; Lamm, Batson and Decety, 2007), but also in its minimal moral connotations (natural propensity to feel the actions of the other as one's own - de Waal 2008; Caffo 2014a). The HA project is articulated in three phases. The first stage is a critical survey of the debate on social ontology mainly (but not exclusively) in analytic philosophy. The main authors discussed are those that have made the history of social ontology: Lewis (1969), Gilbert (1996), Searle (2010), Ferraris (2012), Tuomela (2013) and Smith (2014). HA argues in favour of the thesis of documentality expressed by Ferraris and Smith (see also Caffo and Ferraris 2014), according to which social objects are institutionalized by documents, that is, by written acts. However, HA posits that this approach is correct only in relation to complex social situations (states, universities, etc.). Against Searle and his collective intentionality, HA proposes to understand empathy as an entity explaining the natural processes of construction of social reality in humans through a parallel with the structure of syntax in Chomsky (1957). The thesis I will try to articulate in this first phase of the project is that social objects are an institutionalization of moral objects, naturally arisen from empathic phenomena. They are the condition of possibility for the complex social realities well explained ontologically by theses related to documentality. My project, in this first phase, will try to construct the conditions of possibility for the argument that the more a social reality is constructed in accordance with the natural functioning of empathy, the more correct is its functioning (and the more morally acceptable is its normative and ethical system). The ultimate goal of this phase, therefore, is to argue for a basic empathy / normativity relation (Jensen, Vaish and Schmidt 2014). The second phase of my project will be devoted to a discussion of the implications and arguments set out in the first phase of HA. I think it necessary to highlight the ethical and political consequences of a social ontology in the sense of HA. First, I will clarify the meaning of the term "embodied social ontology" arguing, again in analogy with language, that the structures of empathy – as in language, see the example identified by Bickerton (1981) – tend to make more natural and ontologically simpler certain social situations (in analogy with "languages") and not others. I will also highlight the non-neutral character of regarding empathy as necessary for the representation of social objects: the more a social reality controls items that institutionalize division (at this stage I will also discuss the non-anthropocentric philosophical notion of "otherness" in Derrida 2002, see Caffo 2014b) and social conflict ("war", for example) the more this social reality is to be considered not only morally unacceptable, but unnatural and contrary to the very conditions of the construction of social contexts. The third stage is devoted to the political implications of social ontology as it is approached in HA. It is necessary to propose, even within social ontology, the distinction between interpretation and overinterpretation expressed by Eco (1992): even social objects, in fact, set limits to their possible interpretations. Such limits are set by their moral ancestors discussed in the first stage of HA, which highlights that the inherently normative matrix of social objects. In the final phase of the project I will try to discuss the natural political inclination of social ontology as a kind of higher-order theory, supported by social ontology. My project will therefore end with the mapping of different political models based on the respective ontological/ social assumptions, arguing in favour of models of anarchist inspiration (Wolff 1970) as natural extenders of empathy, which is the ancestor of social reality philosophically articulated in the first stage of HA. The auspice of my project is to suggest that the ontological structure identified in the case of social reality may also explain the nature of other cultural productions such as political and legal entities. As a pragmatic normative type, the social object may serve as a paradigm for an ontology of culture that aims to explain portions of social reality much broader than the domain of local social realities.
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