Something about the Question of Aboutness: Comments on Crane

What makes any intentional state about something? Call this the Question of Aboutness (QA). In his article, Crane discusses and criticizes Putnam’s argument for the assumption that a plausible theory of intentionality should answer QA. Crane focuses on the crucial premise: the claim that what goes for physical representations goes for mental representations. Accepting such a claim, Crane argues, depends on one’s commitment to physicalism or anti-psychologism, two substantial and controversial assumptions one is not forced to accept. Hence, he concludes, the requirement of answering QA should not be imposed as a constraint on theories of intentionality. In my commentary, I do three things. First, contra Crane, I argue that Putnam’s crucial premise can be accepted regardless of one’s commitment to physicalism or anti-psychologism. Second, I sketch an alternative way of justifying that premise on purely methodological grounds. This leads to an improved version of Putnam’s argument. Third, borrowing Kriegel’s distinction between subjective and objective mental representation, I sketch a way of resisting the improved version of Putnam’s argument. However, I argue, that is not enough to prevent some version of QA from arising. So, an answer to QA (or some version of it) still constrains theories of intentionality.