Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly proposed to automate offensive security tasks, with recent studies reporting near human-level success rates in Capture-the-Flag (CTF) challenges. We here revisit these results, providing a second look at these claims. We engineer different agent architectures of increasing complexity and modularity on 30 web-based CTFs challenges spanning 14 vulnerability classes. We instantiate these agents with multiple LLM backbones, and compare them with claude-code, a general-purpose agent that automatically determines its internal architecture. Our evaluation yields three main findings. First, claude-code achieves performance comparable to the engineered architectures (19/30 solved tasks), suggesting that general-purpose agents are strong baselines for offensive security tasks. Second, both our architectures and claude-code struggle in the same challenge categories, revealing persistent barriers that keep current agents below human-level capability. Third, by leveraging our manually designed architectures we can systematically measure the impact of additional components, finding that structured orchestration of specialized roles outperforms monolithic designs, improving run-to-run consistency, and reducing execution costs.

Autonomous LLM Agents & CTFs: A Second Look

Idilio Drago;
2026-01-01

Abstract

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly proposed to automate offensive security tasks, with recent studies reporting near human-level success rates in Capture-the-Flag (CTF) challenges. We here revisit these results, providing a second look at these claims. We engineer different agent architectures of increasing complexity and modularity on 30 web-based CTFs challenges spanning 14 vulnerability classes. We instantiate these agents with multiple LLM backbones, and compare them with claude-code, a general-purpose agent that automatically determines its internal architecture. Our evaluation yields three main findings. First, claude-code achieves performance comparable to the engineered architectures (19/30 solved tasks), suggesting that general-purpose agents are strong baselines for offensive security tasks. Second, both our architectures and claude-code struggle in the same challenge categories, revealing persistent barriers that keep current agents below human-level capability. Third, by leveraging our manually designed architectures we can systematically measure the impact of additional components, finding that structured orchestration of specialized roles outperforms monolithic designs, improving run-to-run consistency, and reducing execution costs.
2026
arXiv
http://arxiv.org/abs/2605.21497v1
Computer Science - Cryptography and Security; Computer Science - Cryptography and Security; Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence
Youness Bouchari; Matteo Boffa; Marco Mellia; Idilio Drago; Thanh Minh Bui; Dario Rossi
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/2162893
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