Data confidentiality is a critical issue in the digital age, impacting interactions between users and public services and between scientific computing organizations and Cloud and HPC providers. Performance in parallel computing is essential, yet techniques for establishing Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) to ensure privacy in remote environments often negatively impact execution time. This paper aims to analyze the performance of a parallel bioinformatics workload for DNA alignment (Bowtie2) executed within the confidential enclaves of Intel SGX processors. The results provide encouraging insights regarding the feasibility of using SGX-based TEEs for parallel computing on large datasets. The findings indicate that, under conditions of high parallelization and with twice as many threads, workloads executed within SGX enclaves perform, on average, 15% faster than non-confidential execution. This empirical demonstration supports the potential of SGX-based TEEs to effectively balance the need for privacy with the demands of high-performance computing.

Performance Analysis on DNA Alignment Workload with Intel SGX Multithreading

Lorenzo brescia
First
;
Iacopo Colonnelli;Marco Aldinucci
2024-01-01

Abstract

Data confidentiality is a critical issue in the digital age, impacting interactions between users and public services and between scientific computing organizations and Cloud and HPC providers. Performance in parallel computing is essential, yet techniques for establishing Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) to ensure privacy in remote environments often negatively impact execution time. This paper aims to analyze the performance of a parallel bioinformatics workload for DNA alignment (Bowtie2) executed within the confidential enclaves of Intel SGX processors. The results provide encouraging insights regarding the feasibility of using SGX-based TEEs for parallel computing on large datasets. The findings indicate that, under conditions of high parallelization and with twice as many threads, workloads executed within SGX enclaves perform, on average, 15% faster than non-confidential execution. This empirical demonstration supports the potential of SGX-based TEEs to effectively balance the need for privacy with the demands of high-performance computing.
2024
Big Data and High-Performance Computing 2024 (BigHPC 2024)
Pisa, Italy
September 17-19, 2024
Proceedings of the 2nd Special Track on Big Data and High-Performance Computing (BigHPC 2024) co-located with the 3rd Italian Conference on Big Data and Data Science (ITADATA 2024)
CEUR-WS
3785
13
24
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3785/paper107.pdf
trusted execution environment, Intel SGX, gramine, occlum, privacy-preserving, confidential computing
Lorenzo brescia, Iacopo Colonnelli, Marco Aldinucci
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/2027795
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